Dual Strategies of the Iranian Army in the Face of Iraqi Threats (1979-1980)

Document Type : Research/Original/Reqular Article

Authors

1 Department of International Organizations, Faculty of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehran, Iran

2 Ph.D. Candidate in Iranian Studies, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

10.22059/jhic.2024.379710.654502

Abstract

This article addresses the question of how the Iranian Army, despite facing numerous challenges following the Islamic Revolution, developed strategies to counter the threat of an Iraqi invasion. This question is particularly relevant given that much existing research focuses on the element of surprise in the subsequent Iran-Iraq War (often referred to as the "Sacred Defense"), implying a lack of preparedness on the part of the Iranian Army in the two years preceding the conflict. This prevailing assumption has influenced many studies.
Based on newly discovered documents from the Iranian Army archives, this research concludes that the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while closely monitoring Iraqi military movements, pursued a dual strategy. On the one hand, it urged Iranian authorities to pursue negotiations with Iraq. On the other hand, it simultaneously strengthened its defensive capabilities in preparation for potential Iraqi attacks.
This second strategy—strengthening defensive capabilities—became the Army's primary plan of action following the Paveh conflict in August 1979 and was actively pursued until September 1980.

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Iranian Journal for the History of Islamic Civilization
Volume 57, Issue 1
September 2024
Pages 85-130

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History

  • Receive Date: 21 July 2024
  • Revise Date: 23 September 2024
  • Accept Date: 01 October 2024

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