نوع مقاله : پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 استاد رشته روابط بین‌الملل، دانشکده روابط بین‌الملل وزارت امور خارجه، تهران، ایران.
2 دانشجوی دکتری رشته ایران‌شناسی، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
This article addresses the question of how the Iranian Army, despite facing numerous challenges following the Islamic Revolution, developed strategies to counter the threat of an Iraqi invasion. This question is particularly relevant given that much existing research focuses on the element of surprise in the subsequent Iran-Iraq War (often referred to as the "Sacred Defense"), implying a lack of preparedness on the part of the Iranian Army in the two years preceding the conflict. This prevailing assumption has influenced many studies.
Based on newly discovered documents from the Iranian Army archives, this research concludes that the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while closely monitoring Iraqi military movements, pursued a dual strategy. On the one hand, it urged Iranian authorities to pursue negotiations with Iraq. On the other hand, it simultaneously strengthened its defensive capabilities in preparation for potential Iraqi attacks.
This second strategy—strengthening defensive capabilities—became the Army's primary plan of action following the Paveh conflict in August 1979 and was actively pursued until September 1980.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
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